COLD WAR THE SPIRIT OF MOSCOW AT TIMES IT WAS ALMOST MORE 
THAN WESTERN VETERANS OF MANY ANTICOMMUNIST BATTLES COULD BEAR . " 
LOVE, " SAID NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV IN MOSCOW, " LOVE AND RESPECT 
FOR OTHER PEOPLE IS WHAT WE NEED . " THE LOVE 
FEAST LASTED ALL WEEK . THE BEAMING SMILE SPLASHING ACROSS KHRUSHCHEV'S 
MOONFACE, THE BLUNT, BACK-SLAPPING PEASANT HUMOR, THE FRIENDLY-BEAR QUALITY OF THE 
SOVIET BOSS WHEN HE DECIDES TO BE AMIABLE ALL THESE FAMILIAR 
TRAITS WERE ON FULL DISPLAY IN MOSCOW AS U.S., BRITISH AND 
RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS SAT DOWN TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE A NUCLEAR TEST 
BAN AGREEMENT . WITH PAINFUL MEMORIES OF THE SHORTLIVED " SPIRIT 
OF GENEVA " IN 1955 AND THE EVANESCENT " SPIRIT OF 
CAMP DAVID " IN 1959, U.S . OFFICIALS REFUSE TO REGARD 
KHRUSHCHEV'S JOVIALITY AS A TRUE BAROMETER OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS . YET 
FROM THE ATMOSPHERE AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE, THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT 
A NEW AND POSSIBLY SOMEWHAT MORE DURABLE SPIRIT OF MOSCOW WAS 
IN THE MAKING . DETECTABLE CHAIR . THE EASY MOOD PREVAILED 
FROM THE MOMENT THE NEGOTIATORS ARRIVED . CHIEF U.S . NEGOTIATOR 
AVERELL HARRIMAN BROUGHT WITH HIM THREE TONS OF TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT, FOR 
THE " HOT LINE " THAT IS TO LINK THE WHITE 
HOUSE AND THE KREMLIN IN EMERGENCIES . AT THE FIRST MEETING, 
HARRIMAN, 71, WAS GREETED BY KHRUSHCHEV WITH A CHEERY " YOU'RE 
ABSOLUTELY BLOOMING . WHAT ARE YOU DOING, COUNTING YOUR YEARS BACKWARD 
? " WHEN BRITAIN'S TOP ENVOY, VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, SAID THAT MOSCOW'S 
WEATHER WAS BETTER THAN LONDON'S, KHRUSHCHEV REPLIED : " WE COULD 
PERHAPS FIND SOME PLACE FOR YOU HERE . YOU COULD BE 
AN INTERNEE . " FINALLY THE PRINCIPALS SAT DOWN AT THE 
CONFERENCE TABLE, ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR TOP AIDES FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO, 
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VALERIAN ZORIN, AND CHIEF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATOR SEMYON TSARAPKIN 
ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE, U.S . AMBASSADOR FOY KOHLER AND BRITISH 
AMBASSADOR SIR HUMPHREY TREVELYAN FOR THE WEST . SAID KHRUSHCHEV : 
" WE BEGIN IMMEDIATELY WITH THE SIGNING . / ADDED GROMYKO 
: " THEN ALL THAT WILL REMAIN WILL BE TO FILL 
THE TREATY IN . " DURING THE EARLY SESSIONS, IT ALMOST 
SEEMED THAT EASY . KHRUSHCHEV SAID THAT, SINCE IT HAD BEEN 
IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FULL BAN IN THE PAST, 
THE TIME HAD COME TO ACHIEVE MORE BY ATTEMPTING LESS . 
HE GAVE SOVIET APPROVAL TO A LIMITED BAN WHICH WOULD COVER 
ALL TESTS EXCEPT THOSE UNDERGROUND, REPEATING HIS FAMILIAR OPPOSITION TO ONSITE 
INSPECTIONS OF POSSIBLE UNDERGROUND BLASTS . AS USUAL, GROMYKO ARGUED THAT 
SUCH INSPECTIONS WERE UNNECESSARY ANYWAY, IN VIEW OF LONG-RANGE SEISMIC DETECTION 
DEVICES . WHEN THE SUDDEN CRASH OF AN ACCIDENTALLY OVERTURNED CHAIR 
STARTLED THE DELEGATES, GROMYKO SAID QUICKLY : " THIS IS CONFIRMATION 
THAT EVERYONE DETECTS IT . " GROWLED HAILSHAM : " IT 
STILL NEEDS INSPECTION . / SELLING MOOD . ARGUING THAT UNDERGROUND 
BLASTS CAN INDEED BE DETECTED FROM FAR OFF BUT NOT DIFFERENTIATED 
FROM EARTHQUAKES, THE U.S . IS NEVERTHELESS WILLING TO DEFER THE 
QUESTION . AS FOR KHRUSHCHEV, HE WAS IN A SELLING MOOD 
. DRAWING OUT OF THE HAT A FIVE-YEAR-OLD SOVIET PROPOSAL, HE 
CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INSPECTION POSTS AT AIRFIELDS, HIGHWAYS, RAILROAD 
STATIONS AND PORTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE IRON CURTAIN TO 
REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK . HE ALSO PROPOSED 1) 
FREEZING OR REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, 2) A REDUCTION OF THE 
ARMED FORCES ON BOTH SIDES IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY, AND 
3) A NONAGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT POWERS 
. HE EVEN SEEMED WILLING TO ACCEPT THE U.S . IDEA 
OF PARALLEL BUT SEPARATE DECLARATIONS INSTEAD OF A FORMAL PACT, WHICH 
WOULD AVOID IMPLICIT U.S . RECOGNITION OF THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST 
REGIME . THE SUDDEN ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW OF A HIGH-LEVEL EAST 
GERMAN DELEGATION THAT INCLUDED WALTER ULBRICHT'S BERLIN SPECIALIST, IMMEDIATELY RAISED SPECULATION 
THAT BERLIN WAS ON THE AGENDA . BUT ANY POSSIBLE DEAL 
INVOLVING BERLIN OR THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE WOULD REQUIRE 
U.S . CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES . WEST GERMANY WASTED LITTLE 
TIME IN WARNING THE U.S . THAT ANY AGREEMENT OTHER THAN 
A TEST BAN WOULD NOT ONLY USHER IN A PERIOD OF 
" FALSE SECURITY " IN EUROPE, BUT WOULD ALSO MAKE IT 
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S.'S EUROPEAN ALLIES TO HEED WASHINGTON'S PLEAS 
FOR HIGHER NATO MILITARY EXPENDITURES OR TO RESPECT THE EMBARGO OF 
" STRATEGIC MATERIALS " TO THE EAST . NO OBSTACLES . 
WHY, AFTER YEARS OF STALLING, IS KHRUSHCHEV PUSHING A TEST BAN 
TREATY AND A DETENTE WITH THE WEST ? WESTERN DIPLOMATS POINT 
TO THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT AS THE MAIN REASON (SEE FOLLOWING STORY) 
ENGAGED IN AN ALL-OUT POWER STRUGGLE WITH THE CHINESE, KHRUSHCHEV PRESUMABLY 
WANTS A TEST BAN TREATY TO DEMONSTRATE TO COMMUNISTS ALL OVER 
THE WORLD THE FEASIBILITY OF " PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE . " NOR 
WOULD KHRUSHCHEV MIND CUTTING DOWN A LITTLE ON THE PROHIBITIVE COST 
OF NUCLEAR TESTING AND PRODUCTION, WHICH IMPEDES HIS OFT-STATED DESIRE TO 
RAISE LIVING STANDARDS IN THE SOVIET UNION . LASTLY, WHILE A 
TEST BAN WOULD NOT BE BINDING ON EITHER FRANCE OR RED 
CHINA, IT WOULD PLACE THE ONUS OF DEFYING THE AGREEMENT ON 
THEM . PRESIDENT KENNEDY SUGGESTED AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK 
THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCORD, THE THREE NEGOTIATORS GO 
TO GENEVA AND GET THE SIGNATURES OF THE 17-NATION GENEVA DISARMAMENT 
CONFERENCE . SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BOX IN THE FRENCH WITH 
SOMETHING MORE THAN AN " ANGLO-SAXON " -SOVIET AGREEMENT FROM THE 
VIEWPOINT OF RUSSIA'S QUARREL WITH THE CHINESE, IT WOULD ALSO PUT 
SUCH GENEVA " NEUTRALS " AS EGYPT, BURMA AND INDIA ON 
THE RECORD AS SUPPORTING A SOVIET-SPONSORED AGREEMENT . AT WEEK'S END 
A TEST BAN AGREEMENT SEEMED NEAR . BANTERING WITH HARRIMAN AT 
A RECEPTION, KHRUSHCHEV SAID : " THE TALKS ARE GOING ON 
WELL . THERE HAVE BEEN NO OBSTACLES . IF THEY GO 
ON AS THEY HAVE, AN AGREEMENT IS IN SIGHT . " 
