THE ALLIES THREE ON A HORSE TOP BRITISH DEFENSE OFFICIALS LISTENED POLITELY 
IN LONDON LAST WEEK WHILE A U.S . NAVY TASK FORCE 
ARGUED THE MERITS OF A MISSILE-FIRING SURFACE FLEET MANNED BY MIXED 
NATO CREWS . THE BRITONS' REAL FEELINGS TOWARD THE MULTILATERAL FORCE 
(MLF) WERE BEST EXPRESSED IN A SARDONIC LIMERICK THAT MADE THE 
ROUNDS OF WHITEHALL : HOORAY FOR THE MULTIMIXED FORCE, GERMAN, BRITISH 
AND YANKEE, OF COURSE ! EACH PRODUCES A KNIGHT, AND THE 
PLAN IS TO FIGHT OR DETER WITH ALL THREE ON ONE 
HORSE . BEHIND U.S . EFFORTS TO SELL MLF WAS THE 
ILL-CONCEALED FACT THAT MILITARY WASHINGTON DOES NOT REALLY BELIEVE IN IT 
EITHER . PRIVATELY THE PENTAGON CONSIDERS IT AT BEST A GIMMICK 
TO POSTPONE " PROLIFERATION " OF INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES TO OTHER 
NATIONS, WHICH IT WANTS AT ALL COSTS TO PREVENT OR DELAY 
. " MONSTROUS NONSENSE . " CHARGED WITH THE HALFHEARTED MISSION 
OF WINNING BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE $5 BILLION MLF WAS ADMIRAL 
CLAUDE RICKETTS, U.S . DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, WHO HAS 
DOUBLED OF LATE AS THE PENTAGON'S MULTIMIXMASTER . STRATEGICALLY, HE ARGUED, 
A FORCE OF 25 POLARIS VESSELS CRUISING EUROPE'S SHALLOW COASTAL WATERS 
COULD NOT EASILY BE DESTROYED BY SOVIET SUBMARINES OR AIRCRAFT . 
SAID RICKETTS : / EACH ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEM ENHANCES THE CREDIBILITY 
OF OTHER SYSTEMS " BUT R.A.F . MARSHAL SIR JOHN SLESSOR 
CALLED IT " MONSTROUS MILITARY NONSENSE, " AND MANY OTHER BRITISH 
DEFENSE OFFICIALS AGREED . THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S MAIN JUSTIFICATION FOR MLF 
IS NOT MILITARY BUT POLITICAL . IT IS AIMED PRIMARILY AT 
SATISFYING WEST GERMANY'S DEMAND FOR AN EQUAL VOICE WITH BRITAIN AND 
FRANCE IN NATO'S NUCLEAR COUNCILS, AND THE GERMANS ARE ALREADY PLEDGED 
TO MATCH THE U.S.'S OFFER TO SHOULDER 40 PER CENT OF 
THE COST . WITHOUT BRITISH BACKING, HOWEVER, MLF WILL NEVER GET 
OFF THE DRAWING BOARD ; THE U.S . IS NOT WILLING 
TO SHARE THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH GERMANY ALONE . 
BUT THE BRITISH, WHO ARE ALREADY COMMITTED TO BUILDING A $1 
BILLION POLARIS SUBMARINE FLEET BY 1970, REPLY THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD 
TO POUR MORE MONEY INTO ANYTHING AS THEORETICAL AS MLF . 
EUROPE'S MOST TELLING OBJECTION TO THE PROJECT IS THAT EVEN IF 
THE ALLIES DID CHIP IN, ULTIMATE CONTROL OF ITS WEAPONS WOULD 
STILL REST WITH THE U.S . WHO NEEDS IT ? THE 
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION HOPES NONETHELESS TO WIN BRITISH AS WELL AS GERMAN 
SUPPORT FOR THE FORCE . " WE CERTAINLY DON'T NEED IT, 
" EXPLAINED A HIGH-RANKING ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL LAST WEEK, / NOR DO 
THE EUROPEANS . BUT IF IT SATISFIES THEM, I THINK IT 
IS WORTH PURSUING . IF IT DOESN'T, WELL, AT LEAST WE 
MADE THE OFFER . " ALL THIS MERELY OBSCURED WHAT OUGHT 
TO BE THE REAL U.S . POLICY AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE 
FOR A TRULY UNITED EUROPE ; 2) FULL U.S . RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE UNTIL THAT GOAL IS ACHIEVED . 
