SOUTH VIET NAM THE PINPRICK WAR LUMBERING LOW OVER STONE AGE VILLAGES 
AND THICK JUNGLES, TROOP-CARRYING HELICOPTERS SWARMED ACROSS THE WILD CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
OF VIET NAM LAST WEEK . ON THE GROUND, 10,000 SOUTH 
VIETNAMESE INFANTRYMEN AND MARINES SPREAD OUT OVER A VAST, INHOSPITABLE SECTOR 
SOUTH OF TAMKY WHERE NO GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAD SET FOOT SINCE 
1938 . IN ONE OF THE BIGGEST DRIVES AGAINST THE COMMUNIST 
VIET CONG SINCE THE GUERRILLA WAR BROKE OUT IN 1959, SOUTH 
VIET NAM'S GOVERNMENT HOPED TO FLUSH SIX RED BATTALIONS AND A 
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY FROM ITS LONGTIME STRONGHOLD IN THE MOUNTAINS . MAIN 
OBJECT OF THE MONTH-LONG OPERATION WAS TO DESTROY VIET CONG FOOD 
CACHES AND CUT THE REDS' MAIN SUPPLY LINE, THE 400-MILE HO 
CHI MINH TRAIL TO NORTH VIET NAM THROUGH NEUTRAL LAOS . 
THE REDS HAD PLAINLY EVACUATED THE AREA IN ADVANCE, BUT VIETNAMESE 
OFFICIALS EXPLAINED THAT THEY DID NOT AIM TO KILL VIET CONG 
GUERRILLAS, ONLY TO ISOLATE THEM . IF SUCCESSFUL, SAID ONE, THE 
SWEEP " WILL SOLVE 50 PER CENT OF OUR MILITARY PROBLEMS 
IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS . " NOT SO, RETORTED SOME OF 
THE U.S . OFFICERS WHO WERE TAKING PART . " IT 
WOULD TAKE A WHOLE U.S . ARMY DIVISION TO BLOCK THAT 
TRAIL, " SAID ONE . THE CLASH OF OPINION EXTENDS TO 
VIRTUALLY EVERY ASPECT OF THE FRUSTRATING, WEARISOME WAR IN SOUTH VIET 
NAM AND REFLECTS ITS SHADOWY, HIDE-AND-SEEK NATURE . IT IS A 
WAR WITH NO FRONT LINES AND NO DECISIVE BATTLES ; A 
WAR OF CONTAINMENT, NOT OF CONQUEST ; A WAR OF LILLIPUTIAN 
PINPRICKS AND BROBDINGNAGIAN STAKES . IT IS A DAY WAR AND 
A NIGHT WAR, IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS MOST HIGHWAYS AND 
WATERWAYS BY DAYLIGHT (THOUGH A U.S . LIEUTENANT AND TWO VIETNAMESE 
SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN A DAYLIGHT ROADSIDE AMBUSH LAST WEEK), AND 
THE VIET CONG SLIP IN FROM JUNGLES AND SWAMPS TO TAKE 
CHARGE AFTER DARK . IN THE RUGGED NORTH, IT IS A 
MOUNTAIN WAR, IN WHICH THE REDS ARE SHORT OF FOOD, MEDICINE, 
WEAPONS, AND LARGELY ON THE DEFENSIVE ; IN THE SOUTH, IT 
IS A BATTLE FOR THE NATION'S RICE GRANARY, WHERE THE GUERRILLAS 
HAVE CUNNINGLY FOILED EVERY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO CLEAN THEM OUT . 
TURNING THE CORNER . HOW IS THE WAR ACTUALLY GOING ? 
MEASURED AGAINST THE DESPERATE SITUATION THAT FACED GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR ON 
A FACT-FINDING MISSION FOR THE PRESIDENT 19 MONTHS AGO, THERE IS 
ROOM FOR QUALIFIED OPTIMISM . WHEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT MCNAMARA 
RETURNED FROM A CONFERENCE WITH SERVICE CHIEFS IN PEARL HARBOR LAST 
WEEK, THE PENTAGON SAID " THE CORNER HAS DEFINITELY BEEN TURNED 
TOWARD VICTORY . " NO ONE WAS SETTING ANY TIMETABLE, BUT 
U.S . MILITARY CHIEFS AND SOUTH VIET NAM'S PRESIDENT NGO DINH 
DIEM SAY THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE WON " WITHIN THREE 
YEARS . " THERE ARE MANY SOLDIERS IN SOUTH VIET NAM 
WHO CONSIDER THIS WILDLY OPTIMISTIC ; SOME BELIEVE THAT THE WAR 
MAY NEVER BE WON . BUT ALMOST EVERYONE AGREES THAT THINGS 
HAVE IMPROVED . TODAY THERE IS LITTLE DANGER THAT THE VIET 
CONG WILL TAKE OVER ANY OF SOUTH VIET NAM'S CITIES . 
CAPTURED RED DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF 
A SWIFT CONQUEST, NOW AIM MERELY, AS THE GUERRILLAS' NORTH VIETNAMESE 
BOSS HO CHI MINH SAID RECENTLY, " TO WAIT OUT THE 
AMERICANS . " THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS 14,000 U.S 
. MILITARY " ADVISERS " PIN THEIR HOPES ON AN INTEGRATED, 
LONG-TERM PLAN THAT AIMS AT ISOLATING AND DRIVING OUT THE VIET 
CONG . BASIC ELEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BATTLE PLAN IS TO 
RESETTLE ALMOST THE ENTIRE RURAL POPULATION IN SOME 12,000 " STRATEGIC 
HAMLETS, " WITH BAMBOO FENCES, BARBED WIRE AND ARMED MILITIAMEN TO 
KEEP THE PREDATORY VIET CONG FROM EXACTING FOOD AND MANPOWER FROM 
A HELPLESS PEASANTRY . ALREADY 8,000,000 VILLAGERS 59 PER CENT OF 
SOUTH VIET NAM'S POPULATION ARE LIVING IN THE 6,000 HAMLETS THAT 
HAVE SO FAR BEEN COMPLETED . PROBLEM WITH PEASANTS . THOUGH 
THE GOVERNMENT ADMITS THAT FEWER THAN ONETHIRD OF THE HAMLETS ARE 
DEFENSIBLE AGAINST A DETERMINED ONSLAUGHT, THE REDS ARE RELUCTANT TO ATTACK 
THE VILLAGES FOR FEAR OF ANTAGONIZING THE PEOPLE . IN SOME 
AREAS, THANKS TO HIGHER STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE HAMLETS, PEASANTS 
ARE FOR THE FIRST TIME INFORMING GOVERNMENT TROOPS OF THE MOVEMENTS 
OF THE VIET CONG . " IF THESE PEOPLE BELIEVE WE 
CAN PROTECT THEM WITH THE HAMLETS, " SAYS ONE U.S . 
ADVISER, " OUR PROBLEM MAY BE LICKED . " HOWEVER, MOST 
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEASANTS ARE STILL EITHER PASSIVE OR ACTIVELY RESENTFUL OF 
THE DIEM REGIME, WHICH IS OFTEN PERSONIFIED BY OPPRESSIVE, CORRUPT LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATORS . FOR ALL HIS HIGH HOPES FOR THE PROGRAM, ALOOF, 
AUTOCRATIC PRESIDENT DIEM SELDOM STIRS FAR FROM HIS YELLOW PALACE IN 
SAIGON TO VISIT THE HINTERLAND AND GENERATE ENTHUSIASM FOR HIS CAUSE 
. SNEAKY PETES . THE AREA OF THE GOVERNMENT'S GREATEST FRUSTRATION 
IS THE MEKONG RIVER DELTA, WHERE 55 PER CENT OF SOUTH 
VIET NAM'S POPULATION IS CENTERED AND 75 PER CENT OF ITS 
RICE IS GROWN . THE PEASANTS THERE HAVE RESISTED THE HAMLET 
PROGRAM AND HAVE OFTEN BEEN FORCIBLY RESETTLED IN FORTIFIED VILLAGES BECAUSE 
THEY RESENT HAVING TO WALK MILES TO THEIR PADDIES . IN 
A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON TWO HAMLETS LAST MONTH, SOME 2,000 VILLAGERS 
SIMPLY VANISHED . THE REDS ARE PARTICULARLY HARD TO FLUSH OUT 
OF THE DELTA BECAUSE THEY OFTEN ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH FROM 
PEACEFUL PEASANTS . ON THE OTHER HAND, U.S . SPECIAL SERVICE 
TROOPS " SNEAKY PETES " HAVE MADE DRAMATIC PROGRESS IN THE 
NORTH BY WINNING OVER AND TRAINING THE DARK-SKINNED, ABORIGINAL MONTAGNARDS . 
THOUGH THEY HAVE FOR CENTURIES BEEN VICTIMIZED BY THE LOWLAND VIETNAMESE, 
WHO CONTEMPTUOUSLY CALL THEM MOI (SAVAGES), 150,000 MONTAGNARDS NOW BELONG TO 
AN AGGRESSIVE, NATIVE FORCE . HELP FOR BANANAS . MILITARILY, THE 
DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE WAR TO DATE HAS BEEN THE INTRODUCTION 
OF SOME 170 U.S.-PILOTED HELICOPTER TRANSPORTS, WHICH GIVE THE GOVERNMENT'S TROOPS 
THE ADVANTAGES OF SURPRISE AND MOBILITY THAT HAD HITHERTO BEEN THE 
GUERRILLAS' MONOPOLY . THE ANTIQUATED " BANANA " COPTERS HAVE BECOME 
INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE AS THE VIET CONG LEARN HOW TO USE NEW 
RAPID-FIRE WEAPONS ; IN ONE SORTIE NEAR THE DELTA VILLAGE OF 
APBAC LAST JANUARY, THEY DOWNED FIVE OF 14 HELICOPTERS, INCLUDING ONE 
OF THE 24 FAST, ROCKET-FIRING HU-1B ( " HUEY " ) 
HELICOPTERS THAT NOW ESCORT MOST MISSIONS . LAST WEEK A SECOND 
COMPANY OF 24 HUEYS ARRIVED AT A NEW BASE NEAR VINH 
LONG . " OPERATIONS WERE DOWN IN THE HUNDREDS A YEAR 
AGO, " SAYS GENERAL PAUL HARKINS, COMMANDER OF U.S . FORCES 
IN SOUTH VIET NAM . " NOW THEY'RE IN THE THOUSANDS 
. " BUT NORMAL BATTLEFIELD STATISTICS ARE LARGELY MEANINGLESS . THE 
VIET CONG'S CASUALTY RATE IS RISING, BUT THE REDS HAVE ACTUALLY 
INCREASED THEIR HARD-CORE STRENGTH (TO AN ESTIMATED 25,000) BY RECRUITING MORE 
PEASANTS . AND THOUGH THE REDS ARE LOSING MANY WEAPONS, THOSE 
THAT THEY ARE CAPTURING ARE MODERN MORTARS AND MACHINE GUNS, WHILE 
THOSE THAT THEY LOSE TO GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE GENERALLY CRUDE DEVICES 
AND OBSOLETE RIFLES . VAIN PLEAS . AS THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS 
BECOME MORE EFFICIENT, THE WILY VIET CONG ARE ALSO LEARNING NEW 
TECHNIQUES . ONE OF THE VIET CONG'S LATEST TACTICS HAS BEEN 
TO MOUNT A SERIES OF FEINTING ATTACKS ON A TARGET, THEN 
TO WITHDRAW, LURING GOVERNMENT RESERVE FORCES INTO A WELL-LAID AMBUSH . 
AS A RESULT, BADLY NEEDED REINFORCEMENTS OFTEN HANG BACK FOR FEAR 
OF WALKING INTO A TRAP . SUCH A WAR IS A 
NEW AND FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE FOR U.S . MILITARY ADVISERS . MINDFUL 
OF THE FACT THAT 73 AMERICANS HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN 
THE FIGHTING SO FAR, THEIR MOST BITTER COMPLAINT IS THAT MILITARY 
OPERATIONS ARE CONSTANTLY HOBBLED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS . THE BIG COMMAND 
DECISIONS HAVE TO BE CLEARED WITH PRESIDENT DIEM, WHO STILL LEANS 
HEAVILY ON SUCH MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY AS BROTHER NGO DINH 
NHU, AND THE BEAUTEOUS MADAME NHU, FOR ADVICE AND SUPPORT IN 
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS . DIEM IS MISTRUSTFUL OF MANY 
OF HIS BEST SOLDIERS AND FEARS ALSO THAT CONTINUED HEAVY CASUALTIES 
WILL UNDERMINE WHAT PUBLIC SUPPORT HE ENJOYS . U.S . OFFICERS 
HAVE PLEADED IN VAIN WITH DIEM TO ALLOW MORE SMALL-UNIT SALLIES 
AND NIGHT OPERATIONS TO CHALLENGE THE VIET CONG'S AFTER-DARK SUPREMACY . 
IN THEIR IMPATIENCE WITH DIEM, SOME EXASPERATED U.S . OFFICIALS WISH 
THAT HE COULD BE REPLACED BY A MORE FLEXIBLE MAN . 
BUT THEY ADMIT THAT THERE IS NO OTHER LEADER IN SIGHT 
. THE REGIME TENDS TO EXAGGERATE ITS SUCCESSES AND MINIMIZE ITS 
FAILURES, INSISTS THAT ITS AIRBORNE ATTACKS HAVE FINALLY " DISHEARTENED " 
THE REDS AND " CAUGHT THEM OFF BALANCE . " MANY 
COMBAT-SEASONED U.S . ADVISERS THINK THAT THIS IS HARDLY ENOUGH . 
" HELL, " SAYS ONE, " IF ALL WE DID WAS 
TO KEEP THEM OFF BALANCE ON GUADALCANAL, WE'D STILL BE THERE 
. " THE ADVISORY WAR . STRATEGICALLY AND POLITICALLY, OF COURSE, 
THE WAR FOR VIET NAM HAS LITTLE IN COMMON WITH THE 
BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL . THE U.S . IS NOT RUNNING THE 
WAR, BUT IS TRYING TO HELP A SENSITIVE YOUNG NATION TO 
WIN FOR ITSELF . IT IS A GUERRILLA WAR IN WHICH, 
AS PRESIDENT DIEM SAYS, " PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS " MAY PROVE MORE 
IMPORTANT THAN KILLING THE ENEMY EVEN THOUGH, IN THE U.S . 
VIEW, HIS REGIME HAS DONE FAR TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE, TO 
WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE RURAL POPULACE . AFTER PROLONGED PRESSURE, 
THE GOVERNMENT AGREED ONLY LAST WEEK TO ASSUME THE $17 MILLION 
ANNUAL COST OF THE HAMLET PROGRAM THE U.S . IN ADDITION 
HAS BEEN SPENDING $400 MILLION A YEAR IN SOUTH VIET NAM 
AND EVEN THIS RELUCTANT DECISION BY DIEM WAS LARGELY INFLUENCED BY 
FEAR THAT THE VILLAGERS WERE SHOWING GREATER LOYALTY TO U.S . 
ADMINISTRATORS THAN TO THE REGIME . DISTRESSING AS THEY MAY BE, 
THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS U.S . 
ADVISERS ARE UNLIKELY TO ABATE . IN FACT, IF THE WAR 
TURNS MORE CLEARLY IN SOUTH VIET NAM'S FAVOR, THE REGIME WILL 
PROBABLY BECOME MORE IMPATIENT OF U.S . ADVICE . FOR THE 
VIETNAMESE, IT IS, AFTER ALL, A WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE . 