MULTI-BAFFLEMENT THE U.S . TODAY IS ENGAGED IN NOT ONE, BUT TWO 
NUCLEAR ARMS RACES . ITS FIRST AND OVERRIDING CONCERN, OF COURSE, 
IS TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION AND TO BE CAPABLE OF MASSIVE 
RETALIATION IF THE RUSSIANS SHOULD ATTACK THE WEST . WASHINGTON'S SECOND 
AIM, HOWEVER, IS LESS STRATEGIC THAN POLITICAL ; IT COULD BE 
CALLED THE THEORY OF THE MASSIVE PLACEBO, SINCE ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE 
IS NOT TO DETER THE FOES OF THE U.S . BUT 
TO MOLLIFY ITS FRIENDS AND DISCOURAGE THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS 
. BY LAST WEEK, U.S . PLACEBO PLANNERS HAD SUCCEEDED ONLY 
IN FRUSTRATING AND PERPLEXING THE VERY ALLIES THEY HOPED TO PLEASE 
. UNEASILY AWARE THAT THE INCREASINGLY PROSPEROUS AND POWERFUL NATIONS OF 
WESTERN EUROPE WOULD NOT FOREVER ACCEPT TOTAL U.S . CONTROL OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE U.S . OFFERED MORE THAN TWO YEARS AGO 
TO GIVE THEM A VOICE IN THEIR DISPOSITION AND USE BUT 
LEFT IT TO EUROPE TO DEVISE A FORMULA . IT WAS 
NOT UNTIL THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION CANCELED THE BUG-RIDDEN SKYBOLT MISSILE PROJECT 
LAST DECEMBER THAT THE U.S . WAS FORCED TO TAKE THE 
INITIATIVE . IN PLACE OF SKYBOLT, THE ADMINISTRATION RELUCTANTLY OFFERED AT 
NASSAU TO SUPPLY POLARIS MISSILES FOR AN INDEPENDENT BRITISH SUBMARINE FORCE 
. CHANGE OF MIND . AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S 
. INSISTED THAT THE BRITISH SUBS MUST BE " MULTINATIONAL, " 
THAT IS, THEY WERE TO BE PART OF A NATO DETERRENT 
IN WHICH OTHER ALLIES MIGHT IN TIME POOL THEIR OWN STRIKE 
FORCES, IF AND WHEN THEY ACQUIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS . TO PLACATE 
ITS OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES, THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION ALSO PROPOSED A " 
MULTILATERAL " FORCE OF POLARIS SUBMARINES, WHICH WOULD BE MULTIMANNED AND 
MULTIFINANCED BY THE U.S . AND ITS PARTNERS, EACH OF WHOM 
WOULD HAVE A VETO OVER THE USE OF THE MISSILES . 
THEN, JUST AS THE EUROPEANS BEGAN TO GET INTERESTED IN THIS 
SCHEME, THE U.S . ABRUPTLY CHANGED ITS MIND AND ANNOUNCED THAT 
THE MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF) SHOULD CONSIST OF POLARIS-ARMED SURFACE VESSELS INSTEAD 
THOUGH IT WOULD BE LITTLE STRATEGIC VALUE, A 25-SHIP SURFACE FORCE 
WOULD COST ONLY $500 MILLION YEARLY, FAR LESS THAN A SUBMARINE 
FLEET . TO MOST EUROPEANS, THE STRONGEST ARGUMENT FOR THE MLF 
WAS THAT IT WOULD GIVE WEST GERMANY A VOICE IN NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY AND POSSIBLY DISCOURAGE IT FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ITS 
OWN, WITH OR WITHOUT HELP FROM FRANCE FRANKLY INTERESTED . TO 
PEDDLE THE PLACEBO, THE ADMINISTRATION PLUCKED OLD STATE DEPARTMENT HAND LIVINGSTON 
MERCHANT FROM RETIREMENT . TO HIS SURPRISE, MLF MET WITH A 
SURPRISINGLY WARM RECEPTION . THOUGH SOME ALLIED STATESMEN HEMMED THAT ITS 
COST WOULD PREVENT THEM FROM MEETING U.S . REQUESTS TO STRENGTHEN 
CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND BELGIUM WERE FRANKLY INTERESTED . 
LAST MONTH MERCHANT ACTUALLY SUCCEEDED IN EXTRACTING A COMMITMENT FROM WEST 
GERMANY TO PAY 40 PER CENT OF THE ENTIRE COST OF 
THE PROJECT . HOWEVER, LAST WEEK, WORD REACHED NATO HEADQUARTERS IN 
PARIS THAT WASHINGTON HAD SUDDENLY LOST ITS ENTHUSIASM FOR THE MULTILATERAL 
FORCE . ITS CHANGE OF MIND NOT ONLY LEFT UNSOLVED THE 
POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT MLF WAS DEVISED TO SOLVE, BUT EVEN SEEMED 
LIKELY TO AGGRAVATE THEM, SINCE THE U.S . WAS NOW REPORTEDLY 
READY TO BACK THE IDEA OF INDEPENDENT MULTINATIONAL FORCES INSTEAD, THUS 
ENCOURAGING ITS ALLIES TO BUILD THEIR OWN BOMBS . EVEN IF 
EVERY NATO ALLY COULD AFFORD ITS OWN NUCLEAR FORCE AND A 
SCIENTIFIC BREAKTHROUGH MAY YET MAKE THAT FEASIBLE EUROPE WOULD HAVE ONLY 
A MINUTE PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL U.S . NUCLEAR ARMORY . 
BUT WHO CAN PREDICT HOW IT WILL TURN OUT ? IN 
THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUILD-YOUR-OWN-BANG, IT COULD EVEN HAPPEN THAT 
EUROPEAN HYDROGEN BOMBS MIGHT NOT FALL ON THE SOVIET UNION AT 
ALL, BUT ON THE U.S . 