THE ALLIES AFTER NASSAU IN DECEMBER 1960, THE U.S . FIRST PROPOSED 
TO HELP NATO DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE . BUT 
EUROPE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO DEVISE A PLAN . LAST WEEK, 
AS THEY STUDIED THE NASSAU ACCORD BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME 
MINISTER MACMILLAN, EUROPEANS SAW EMERGING THE FIRST OUTLINES OF THE NUCLEAR 
NATO THAT THE U.S . WANTS AND WILL SUPPORT . IT 
ALL SPRANG FROM THE ANGLO-U.S . CRISIS OVER CANCELLATION OF THE 
BUG-RIDDEN SKYBOLT MISSILE, AND THE U.S . OFFER TO SUPPLY BRITAIN 
AND FRANCE WITH THE PROVED POLARIS (TIME, DEC . 28) . 
THE ONE ALLIED LEADER WHO UNRESERVEDLY WELCOMED THE POLARIS OFFER WAS 
HAROLD MACMILLAN, WHO BY THUS KEEPING A SEPARATE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FOR 
BRITAIN HAD SAVED HIS OWN NECK . BACK FROM NASSAU, THE 
PRIME MINISTER BEAMED THAT BRITAIN NOW HAD A WEAPON THAT " 
WILL LAST A GENERATION . THE TERMS ARE VERY GOOD . 
" MANY OTHER BRITONS WERE NOT SO SURE . THOUGH THE 
GOVERNMENT WILL SHOULDER NONE OF THE $800 MILLION DEVELOPMENT COST OF 
POLARIS, IT HAS ALREADY POURED $28 MILLION INTO SKYBOLT AND WILL 
HAVE TO SPEND PERHAPS $1 BILLION MORE FOR A FLEET OF 
MISSILE-PACKING SUBMARINES . AT BEST, THE BRITISH WILL NOT BE ABLE 
TO DESIGN, BUILD AND PROVE ITS NUCLEAR FLEET BEFORE 1970, THREE 
YEARS AFTER BRITAIN'S BOMBER FORCE HAS PRESUMABLY BECOME OBSOLETE . THEN 
WHAT ? TORY BACKBENCHERS ARE LOUDLY SKEPTICAL OF WHAT THEY CALL 
" THE SMALL TYPE " IN THE NASSAU PACT, WHICH STIPULATES 
THAT BRITAIN'S POLARIS SUBMARINE FLEET, EXCEPT WHEN " SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS 
" INTERVENE, MUST BE COMMITTED TO A TRULY MULTILATERAL NATO FORCE 
. DOES THAT MEAN THAT BRITAIN WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NO STRIKE 
FORCE OF ITS OWN ? WHO WILL DECIDE WHEN OR WHETHER 
NATIONAL INTERESTS JUSTIFY WITHDRAWAL OF SUBMARINES FROM NATO, PARTICULARLY IF THOSE 
NATIONAL INTERESTS CONFLICT WITH U.S . POLICY ? THE BIGGEST QUESTION 
OF ALL IS WHETHER FRANCE'S INCLUSION IN THE OFFER WAS A 
DELIBERATE PLOY BY JACK KENNEDY TO END OR AT LEAST DOWNGRADE 
BRITAIN'S PRIZED " SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP " WITH THE U.S . THE 
CARTOONISTS WENT EVEN FARTHER . THEY NOT ONLY SHOWED SUPERMAC JUMPING 
TO SUPERJACK'S COMMANDS, BUT DE GAULLE AND ADENAUER AS WELL . 
AS EDITH SAID . THE FRENCH, WHO GOT NO HELP FROM 
THE U.S . IN DEVELOPING THEIR FORCE DE FRAPPE, WERE QUICK 
TO CROW THAT BRITAIN'S VAUNTED TIES WITH THE U.S . HAD 
BROUGHT IT NOTHING BUT HUMILIATION . BY CONTRAST, BRAGGED FRENCH OFFICIALS, 
THE SKYBOLT FIASCO ONLY VINDICATED FRANCE'S DECISION TO DEVELOP ITS OWN 
BOMBS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS . THUS, THOUGH CHARLES DE GAULLE PROMISED 
TO " REFLECT " ON THE POLARIS OFFER, THERE WAS LITTLE 
LIKELIHOOD THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT ANY OFFER THAT WOULD SUBJECT A 
FRENCH FORCE TO ALLIED CONTROL . IT IS DE GAULLE'S UNSWERVING 
CONVICTION THAT IF THE RUSSIANS WERE ACTUALLY TO INVADE WESTERN EUROPE, 
NO NATION THAT WAS NOT DIRECTLY ATTACKED MEANING THE U.S . 
WOULD INVITE NUCLEAR DEVASTATION BY HELPING ITS ALLIES . THUS UNLIKE 
BRITAIN'S BOMBER FORCE, WHICH ALL ALONG HAS BEEN PLEDGED TO " 
THE WESTERN STRATEGIC DETERRENT, " FRANCE'S FORCE DE FRAPPE WILL BE 
RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR FRANCE'S DEFENSE . AT THE SAME TIME, DE 
GAULLE HAS LONG ARGUED THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE COULD BE RUN 
MOST EFFICIENTLY BY A TRIUMVIRATE THAT WOULD INCLUDE FRANCE AS AN 
EQUAL OF THE U.S . AND BRITAIN . THIS IS ONE 
OF HIS MAJOR, IF UNSPOKEN, CONDITIONS FOR BRITISH MEMBERSHIP IN THE 
COMMON MARKET ; AND DE GAULLE SUGGESTED POINTEDLY TO MACMILLAN THAT 
IT WOULD HELP IF BRITAIN WERE TO SHARE ITS ADVANCED MISSILE 
TECHNOLOGY WITH FRANCE . WHEN MACMILLAN REPLIED NONCOMMITTALLY THAT HE WOULD 
HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH KENNEDY, DE GAULLE TOLD HIS GUEST 
WITH HAUTEUR THAT FRANCE IN THAT CASE COULD DO NOTHING TO 
EASE BRITAIN'S ENTRY INTO EUROPE . GO-IT-ALONE GRANDEUR . KONRAD ADENAUER, 
ON THE OTHER HAND, IS FEARFUL THAT DE GAULLE WILL SNAP 
UP THE POLARIS OFFER AND IN THIS WAY ACHIEVE HIS GOAL 
OF A THREE-NATION NATO DIRECTORATE . THOUGH HIS GOVERNMENT VOWED IN 
1954 NOT TO MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ADENAUER HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE 
THAT WITHOUT THEM, AND WITH NO SAY IN THEIR USE, WEST 
GERMANY WILL BE RELEGATED TO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE . 
LAST WEEK AN OFFICIAL BULLETIN EVEN REVIVED THE OLD, BITTER CRY 
THAT U.S . PLEAS FOR GREATER RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE 
AIMED AT RAISING GERMAN " CANNON FODDER " FOR U.S . 
" ATOMIC KNIGHTS . " A FROSTY LETTER FROM THE CHANCELLOR 
TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY SUGGESTED THAT GERMANY, WHICH ALREADY SUPPLIES ALMOST 50 
PER CENT OF NATO GROUND STRENGTH, DOES NOT INTEND TO RAISE 
ANY MORE DIVISIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE . YET U.S . STRATEGIC 
PLANNERS REASON THAT THE ONLY CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO SOVIET ATTACK IS 
A STRONG ARMY ON THE GROUND, BACKED BY THE VAST U.S 
. NUCLEAR ARSENAL . FACT IS, THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS COULD NEVER BE USED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE U.S . AGAINST 
RUSSIA WITHOUT INVITING DEVASTATING SOVIET RETALIATION . AFTER ALL THEIR EFFORTS, 
THE BRITISH AND FRENCH WILL HAVE MANAGED TO CREATE A NUCLEAR 
CAPACITY THAT REPRESENTS ONLY 4 PER CENT OF U.S . NUCLEAR 
POWER . " IT IS JUST A DAMNED NUISANCE, " SAID 
A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL LAST WEEK . " IT MEANS NOTHING 
MILITARILY EXCEPT THAT WE WILL BE EXPECTED TO BAIL OUT THE 
FIRST COUNTRY THAT THROWS THE FIRST PEA AT THE RUSSIANS OR 
ANYONE ELSE . " CHARLES DE GAULLE COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED 
TO AGREE, AT LEAST UNTIL HIS FORCE DE FRAPPE BECOMES OBSOLETE 
. FOR BRITAIN AND GERMANY, THE MULTILATERAL DETERRENT MAKES IMMEDIATE SENSE 
. EVENTUALLY, FRANCE, TOO, MAY WELL FIND A NATO-CONTROLLED POLARIS FLEET, 
OR ITS POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR, A EUROPEAN MINUTEMAN ARSENAL, THE ONLY ANSWER 
TO THE SPIRALING COST AND DIMINISHING VALUE OF GO-IT-ALONE GRANDEUR . 
