

Internet virus of November 1998

- Reported in all the media
- Infected many, many sites
- Infected only Unix machines
- Infected only VAX and Sun3
- Virus or worm?

methods of infection

- mail
 - sendmail program has a DEBUG mode
- remote shell
 - Connect via rsh to a *trusting* system
- finger
 - Overflow finger server's buffer and changes its behavior *radically*
- remote execution (with passwords)
 - Use *discovered* user passwords to break into new machines via rexec

cost of the worm


- Network disconnection
 - Loss of service (mail)
- Time of system administrators
- End of the age of innocence
- Robert T. Morris, Jr.
- Robert T. Morris, Sr.
- Continuing (smaller) look-alike attacks
- **No file damage**

the SENDMAIL attack

- sendmail (the SMTP daemon of Unix) accepts connections of TCP port 25
- Worm transmits to sendmail:

```
debug  
mail from: </dev/null>  
rcpt to: <"|sed -d '1 ,/^$/d |/bin/sh; exit 0">  
data  
"  
..
```
- Shell is started at the remote site executing commands send by the worm through the TPC connection.

first subgoal of the worm




the RSH attack

- Worm simply executes:
`/usr/ucb/rsh target`
`/usr/bin/rsh target`
`/bin/rsh target`
- If the infecting site is trusted by the target, that is, listed in `/etc/hosts.equiv` or in the `.rhosts` file of the worm's *user*, a shell connected to the worm will be spawned on the target machine.

the REXEC attack

- Worm gets a list of local users by reading `/etc/passwd`. It attempts to crack user passwords using likely guesses, such as the user's name.
- If a password is cracked, the worm attempts to connect to the `rexec` daemon (TCP port 512) on target machines where the user is likely to have an account. This will succeed if the same password is used at the target machine.
- Worm will use `rexec` to assume the identity of the owner of the cracked password on the infected machine and then pursue the `rsh` attack on a target machine.

first goal achieved
all else is easy




the finger attack

- Worm connects to the finger daemon (TCP port 79) on the target machine.
- The finger daemon expects to be sent the name of the user to be fingered. It uses the Unix library routine `gets` to read this name into a 512 byte buffer. `gets` has only one argument, a pointer to the buffer.

So...

- Note: only works on VAXen.

- Worm transmits and compiles a 99-line bootstrap program.
- The bootstrap is run with the infecting worm's IP number and TCP port number as arguments.
- Bootstrap connects to the infecting worm.




Stack frame before
"name" is read

return address to system
line[512] the buffer and a local variable of main
other locals of main
return address to main
locals of gets

Stack frame after
"name" is read

return address to the CODE
CODE!
The system call <code>execve</code> with the argument "/bin/sh"
other locals of main
return address to main
locals of gets

- Bootstrap receives three files:
 - 1) Sun 3 object for the worm;
 - 2) Vax object for the worm; and
 - 3) C code for the bootstrap.
- Bootstrap then `execl`'s `/bin/shell`



- Infecting worm links, in turn, the object modules.
- The result of the link is executed with the three worm ingredients as arguments.
- If successful, a new worm is established.
- The new worms reads (and deletes) its ingredients then kills the shell.



worm population explosion

- Randomly, one of every seven worms was born immortal.
- If several worms entered machines at once, at most one can bind TCP port 23357. Others may never participate in worm-present checks.
- As system load rises, worm-to-worm communication attempts will frequently time-out.
- Consequently, the worm overwhelmed some machines in minutes and was quickly noticed.

worm procreation

- Potential sites for the next infection:
 - gateways
netstat -n -r
 - local networks
SIOCCIFCONF ioctl system call
 - equivalent hosts
/etc/hosts.equiv
 - user-specific “equivalent” hosts
user’s .forward and .rhosts files
- Methods and sites of attack are time-shared.

worm birth control

- How can the number of worms be limited without making the worm vulnerable to *mock worms*?
 - A new worm tries to connect to local TCP port 23357. If a connection is made, the two worms exchange bytes and decide which one will *quit*.
 - Every few seconds, the non-quitter will briefly hibernate while attempting to accept connections of TCP port 23357.